Exchange Is No Change by U, Peter Lee





PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS
researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach
and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
This Notes is part of the paper entitled "Competition Policy for
the Philippine Downstream Oil Industry" by the same author under the
Philippine APEC Study Center Network (PASCN) project on competi-
tion policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not




*Paper presented during the Roundtable Discussion on the Proposed
National Oil Exchange jointly sponsored and organized by the Congres-
sional Planning and Budget Office and the Philippine Institute for De-
velopment Studies, September 21, 2000, Batasang Pambansa Complex.
**The author is Assistant Professor at the School of Economics, Uni-
versity of Asia and the Pacific.
I
n recent months, international crude oil prices have
been rising and consequently, local pump prices
have been rising, too. Unfortunately for the oil in-
dustry, perhaps no other product in the economy has as
wide a clientele, direct and indirect. Everyone has to travel
or consume goods that have to be transported and pro-
duced using power that, chances are, is generated with
oil-based fuel. Not surprisingly, the price increases have
sparked widespread protests, even around the world.
Witness the recent blockades by truck drivers in parts of
Europe protesting high gasoline prices. This certainly
suggests that there is a real global underlying problem
and that the high prices are not simply the work of the
so-called local big three (Shell, Petron, and Caltex).
Of course, nobody likes to pay more for anything.
Thus, various groups have been clamoring for government
to do something to alleviate the situation. This has
spawned proposals like reducing taxes on fuel and the
National Oil Exchange bill of Bataan Congressman Enrique
Garcia. The proposed oil exchange (and public sentiment
supporting it) seems to be premised on two things.
One, that deregulation has failed and instead cre-
ated a monster cartel in the form of the big three that
can control and dictate prices. Therefore, government
should step back in with some form of regulation such
as the oil exchange.
And two, that such an oil exchange can actually bring
down prices.
Downstream oil deregulation – failure?
First of all, what is the rationale for deregulation? A
fair assessment of the success or failure of deregulation
can be made only with a proper appreciation of its objec-
tive. Lower price per se is not the objective of deregula-2
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tion, though it often does accompany it. The primary rea-
son for deregulation is to improve resource allocation by
subjecting decisions to market forces. Deregulation may
also attract new players and investment, increasing the
amount of competition. As a result, efficiency gains can
be realized in the long run. Thus, prices can fall after
deregulation, ceteris paribus (i.e., assuming all other fac-
tors like exchange rates, crude oil prices, and others re-
main the same). However, a deregulated market can
sometimes also result in higher prices when, for example,
the product had previously enjoyed heavy subsidies which
are then taken away with deregulation.
In the case of oil, there are also other reasons for
the price increases. The Philippines produces very little
crude oil of its own and must import almost all its needs.
Thus, we are subject to the vagaries of international oil
price movements, which in turn are determined to a large
degree by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) quotas. From the low teens in terms of US$
per barrel as recent as the early part of 1999, crude oil
prices have skyrocketed to as much as over US$30 per
barrel in recent weeks. The other important determinant
of imported cost of oil is the foreign exchange rate. In
recent weeks, the peso has also been depreciating and
this has exerted further upward pressure on pump prices.
Figure 1 shows the relative movements of the peso
cost of imported crude oil and local pump prices. The
series have been indexed with January 1998 as the base
point. Thus, relative to January 1998, it is very clear that
the imported cost of crude oil has outstripped local pump
prices. Moreover, Department of Energy (DOE) statistics
show that pump prices in Manila are among the lowest in
the region, even lower than Thailand and the U.S. (for
unleaded gasoline and diesel).
One sign that the oil industry deregulation is work-
ing is that new players have come in. Data from DOE
show that fuels bulk marketing has the most number of
new players in operation as of June 1999, with twenty
four. Retail marketing was second with thirteen new play-
ers while LPG bulk marketing and terminaling had five
and three, respectively. No new player has yet entered
the refining business. Among the new players are large
foreign companies such as Total (French) and Coastal
Corporation (American). The new players have likewise
invested P12-15 billion.
It is true that the big three (Caltex, Petron and Shell)
still command the lion’s share of the total market (al-
most 90%). The new players, however, have been fairly


























PG UG D Crude Oil Cost
Figure 1. Indexed Historical Prices of Imported
Crude Oil and Local Pump Prices (Pesos)
(Jan. 1998 = 100)
Legend:
PG = premium gasoline
UG = unleaded gasoline
D = diesel
Source of raw data: Department of Energy
"It is true that the big three (Caltex, Petron
and Shell) still command the lion’s share of
the total market (almost 90%). The new
players, however, have been fairly successful




ket. In some sectors like
LPG, new players' market
share has even reached 23
percent, already a bigger
market share than Caltex!
The retail distribution
of gasoline and diesel is
much more visible to the public. Thus, attention has some-
what been fixated on this subsector. Here, the new play-
ers admittedly have made the smallest dent. As of the
first quarter of this year, DOE statistics show that they
have captured only 5.3 percent of this market, up never-
theless from 3.9 percent last year. This slow market pen-
etration is explained mostly by the fact that to be able to
sell in retail, a network of gasoline stations is needed.
The new players have a long way to go to catch up with
the big three here. The new players have about 200 sta-
tions versus over 3,000 for the big three combined. Fur-
thermore, each gasoline station can cost anywhere from
P10 to P20 million pesos. Thus, the capital requirements
of a network of retail gasoline stations are indeed great.
Considering the amount of time and capital needed to
identify the location, acquire or negotiate leases and con-
struct the stations, it is obvious that it will be some time
yet before the new players can capture a more signifi-
cant market share.
On the other hand, industrial sales would require
only bulk storage and hauling facilities, both of which are
necessary prerequisites anyway for retail distribution. This
explains why the new players have been able to acquire
13 percent of this subsector, which is arguably a decent
performance given the less than five years in which the
market has been opened to them.
Thus, has deregulation failed? My opinion is that it
has not failed. On the contrary, it is working, albeit the
slow progress in some sectors. The irony is that going
back on deregulation with something like an oil exchange
will even discourage the entry of the very same new play-
ers that will provide further competition in the future that
will loosen the big three’s hold on the market. Moreover,
"Considering the amount of time and capital
needed to identify the location, acquire or
negotiate leases and construct the stations,
it is obvious that it will be some time yet
before the new players can capture a more
significant market share."
fined petroleum through bidding and term con-
tract negotiation open to all oil refineries and
traders in the world, in order to obtain the low-
est price for said products.” (HB 12052 Sec. 4
and 8)
Furthermore, “only the refined petroleum products of the
lowest complying winning bidder/s and term contractor/s
it will further damage our country’s overall investment
attractiveness as it lends further fuel to investor percep-
tion of policy flip-flopping by government.
Will a National Oil Exchange reduce oil prices?
What is the National Oil Exchange? The draft House
Bill No. 12052 conceives of the national oil exchange as
a “government-owned and -controlled corporation.” It
“shall determine the country’s total monthly re-
quirements for refined petroleum products, and
shall exclusively handle their original acquisition/
purchase, storage and eventual distribution to
distributors and wholesalers”, including the big
three. This oil exchange “shall acquire/purchase
the country’s requirement of each and every re-
"...Going back on deregulation with something like an oil exchange
will even discourage the entry of the very same new players that will
provide further competition in the future that will loosen the big three’s
hold on the market."4
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may and shall be placed in commerce in the Philippines.”
This last provision will therefore effectively make it a
monopoly seller of refined products to the distributors
(the big three and new players).
This proposed government entity will naturally re-
quire storage facilities for its inventory of refined product
purchases. Originally, Congressman Garcia’s proposal had
been as extreme as taking over all such facilities in the
country, including those privately owned by the big three
and new players. He has since toned down this provision
and HB No. 12052 stipulates that the oil exchange will
“take over and operate the government-owned
ocean receiving terminals and storage depots at
Subic and Clark to receive and store all refined
petroleum products. For this purpose, the OILEX
shall take control of the operation of said facili-
ties subject to the requirements of the Constitu-
tion and existing laws. Such facilities shall be
used exclusively by the OILEX for the storage and
distribution of the products of the lowest com-
plying and winning bidder/s and term contrac-
tor/s. The refined petroleum products coming
from the winning local oil refineries may be main-
tained in their respective storage facilities, sub-
ject to the exclusive control and disposition of
the OILEX.” (HB No. 12052 Sec. 7)
The concept of a National Oil Exchange seems to
make sense intuitively. Anyone who has haggled in a
palengke has experienced getting a discount when he
buys in bulk or in greater volume. And this is precisely
what makes it a dangerous idea. The mistake is to ex-
trapolate from this experience and conclude that the same
thing will happen with the oil exchange. The mistake lies
in forgetting the relative sizes of the Philippine market
and the total international market for oil. Oftentimes, our
day-to-day haggling experience is limited to encounters
with small individual merchants in the market or tiangge.
Imagine however, what sort of results you could expect
haggling over the price of a couple of shirts with, say,
Shoemart. You would probably be asked to take it or leave
it. The matter of oil purchase transaction is similar to the
latter situation. The total Philippine consumption for oil
is estimated at 350,000 barrels per day. In contrast, the
world market is estimated to be more than 70 million
barrels a day. It is thus very difficult to imagine that we
could get any significant price discount, given our very
small demand relative to the total market, and even with
the volumes that major oil traders transact.
Another charge made against the major oil compa-
nies is the alleged improper practice of transfer pricing.
This refers to the overpricing of inputs (in this case, crude
oil) by a mother company to its subsidiary which would
inflate the mother company's profits while reducing the
subsidiary’s. However, actual practices vary here. While
Petron has a supply agreement with ARAMCO (and not
an exclusive one at that since Petron also buys from other
sources), Shell, for example, reports that it sources most
of its crude oil from non-Shell crude oil fields such as the
National Iran Oil Company (NIOC), which is owned by the
Iranian government. Thus, these facts would belie the
accusation.
If transfer pricing is really excessive, then it ought
to be the case that you could import the final refined
products from a major oil trading market like Singapore
at significant savings. The DOE has estimated a cost
"build-up" based on the Mean of Platt's Singapore (MOPS)
price for refined unleaded and diesel final products in
August (Figure 2). This is the average price for those prod-
ucts prevailing in Singapore, a free and unfettered mar-
ket, and so the prices should be competitive. Their com-
putations in fact show that the completely built up price
would have been higher than the then prevailing local
prices: P17.23 vs. P16.85 per liter for unleaded and
P14.09 vs. P13.03 per liter for diesel. In other words, an
oil exchange would not have succeeded in reducing prices
and may even have resulted, ironically, in higher prices.
Moreover, economists recognize that transfer pric-
ing is a valid management practice to optimize resource
allocation among a firm’s various divisions when the trans-
fer prices are set at their proper levels or at the opportu-5
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nity costs of the transferred re-
sources. Transfer prices allow the vari-
ous divisions of a conglomerate to
balance the flow of resources among
themselves to optimize conglomerate
wide profits. If a transfer price was set
too high, then the “buying” subsidiary
would get the signal that it is costlier
than it actually is to engage in its op-
erations and thus curtail its output.
Moreover, it would have a more diffi-
cult time competing because of its “in-
flated” internal costs. In the context
of this paper, an oil major could not
maintain excessively “high” transfer
prices in the long run because the
other majors’ subsidiaries with the
correct transfer price built in would be
able to undercut its subsidiary in price.
On the other hand, the “selling” division would be
misled into thinking its operations were more profitable
than it actually is and overproduce its output. Then when
it tries to sell the excess outside the conglomerate, it
discovers that it can’t sell any because the market price
is lower than the transfer price. Overall profits of the con-
glomerate might suffer in the end. Thus, the conglomer-
ate has an incentive to transfer price among its subsid-
iaries at the economically “proper” transfer prices, i.e.,
their true opportunity costs.
For the most important objection to the oil exchange,
meanwhile, we return to the fact that the proposal would
institute a monopoly in the form of the oil exchange. All
distributors would have to purchase their stocks from it.
This raises the question of whether the oil exchange will
operate as a nonprofit or a profit-making enterprise. If it
operates for profit, then it will lead to a case of what
economists call “double marginalization.” It will charge a
margin for profit, and then on top of that, the distributors
will also charge another margin for themselves. Thus,
prices may even end up higher than without an oil ex-
change.
Suppose it operates as a nonprofit and simply
passes on whatever savings in purchase discounts it
enjoys to the distributors.1 What guarantee is there that
the distributors will pass on the savings to the consum-
ers? In fact, if the distributors are a cartel or a monopoly
themselves, they will tend to keep some of the savings
for themselves. Thus, it would be an economically ineffi-
————————
1This seems to be what HB No. 12052 Sec. 8 contemplates:
Sec. 8 Selling and Oil Pricing Mechanism – The OILEX shall sell,
ex-plant and at cost, to all distributors and wholesalers all the refined
petroleum products it will acquire. The cost, aside from the acquisition
price, shall include recovery of expenses of the OILEX, etc.
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Figure 2. Unleaded Gasoline and Diesel Price Build Up
August 2000, MOPS-based (In pesos per liter)
"All distributors would have to purchase
their stocks from the oil exchange. This raises
the question of whether the oil exchange will
operate as a nonprofit or a profit-making
enterprise. If it operates for profit, then it
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cient way of helping the consumer. This possibility is ana-
lyzed and dealt with more extensively in chapter 4 of U
(2000).2
Then there are also other logistical problems. The
Subic-Clark facilities will accommodate only about a fourth
or 25 percent of the total Philippine market demand. More-
over, it has no LPG storage facilities. Thus, an oil ex-
change would still either have to build storage for the
remainder (a very costly proposition) or lease it from the
current private companies. Refining is also a continuous
process. It cannot be shut down and started up easily
like a light bulb. The oil exchange would create a highly
risky business environment for refineries. If a refining
company cannot be assured that it will win next month’s
(or even the next few months’ bidding for that matter),
what would it do with its output? The incentives would be
stacked heavily in favor of simply trading and abandon-
ing refining. This would not bode well for our security of
supply.
Monopolies likewise tend to be inefficient precisely
because they have no competition. The government has
not had a particularly good track record in operating
monopolies. Witness the case of Nasutra. While the oil
exchange will not engage in manufacturing, it may be
inefficient in its administration of the exchange, e.g., pur-
chasing, allocation and distribution of the refined prod-
ucts. Problems of graft and corruption also loom large in
the bidding and allocation of the product as well as the
bidding out of ancillary contractual functions like haul-
ing, shipping and others. A government-run oil exchange
would probably also be susceptible to political pressure
to subsidize the prices of products to keep them artifi-
cially low. This is why the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)
ended up in a deficit when the industry was regulated
and why the National Power Corporation is not profitable.
Lastly, if the big three are in fact a monopolistic
cartel and collude to overprice their products, they are
able to do so because they control most of the retail
outlets. The oil exchange does nothing to address this.
In fact, the oil exchange would simply deliver cheaper
goods to this cartel to sell, assuming again that in fact it
will be able to obtain the refined products at a substan-
tial discount. Besides, if the big three really were colluding,
could they not also collude and rig the submission of
bids to the oil exchange? If this were the case, the solu-
tion is really enforcement of antitrust laws and empower-
ing of the concerned government agencies with the re-
sources to detect, prevent and prosecute, if need be,
such anti-competitive behavior.
Summary
We seem to have forgotten that the market has not
always been regulated. For many years before martial
law and the first oil crisis in the 1970s, the industry was
a relatively free one with as much as four refiners and six
marketing companies. The country apparently got along
well with such a set-up. Ironically, the years of regulation
and control since then have left us with the highly con-
centrated oligopolistic market structure for the industry,
i.e., few players with large market shares. It is very diffi-
cult to deconstruct that and return to a more competitive
market overnight. We need to be realistic and patient
and give the oil deregulation law enough time to take
effect.  4 4
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2Peter Lee U. “Deregulation and competition policy in the Philip-
pine downstream petroleum industry.” PASCN Research Paper, Philip-
pine Institute for Development Studies, August 2000.